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0 - ABSTRACT: 
Self-reflexive videogames are videogames designed to materialize critical and/or satirical perspectives 
on the ways in which videogames themselves are designed, played, sold, manipulated, experienced, and 
understood as social objects. This essay focuses on the use of virtual worlds as mediators, and in particu-
lar on the use of videogames to guide and encourage reflections on technical, interactive, and thematic 
conventions in videogame design and development.  
Structurally, it is composed of two interconnected parts: 
1. In the first part of this essay I will discuss NECESSARY EVIL (http://evil.gua-le-ni.com), an exper-
imental videogame that I designed as a self-reflexive virtual artifact. With the objective of clari-
fying the philosophical aspirations of self-reflexive videogames – and in order to understand 
how those aspirations can be practically pursued – I will dissect and examine the design deci-
sions that contributed to the qualities of NECESSARY EVIL as an example of ‘playable philoso-
phy’. 
2. Taking off from the perspectives on self-reflexive videogames offered in the first part of the es-
say, the second half will focus on virtual worlds as viable mediators of philosophical thought 
more in general. In this section, I will argue that, both through the practice of game design and 
through the interactive experiences of virtual worlds, twenty-first century philosophers have the 
possibility to challenge the often-unquestioned understanding of written discourse as the only 
context in which philosophical thought can emerge and be developed. 
 
1.1 – AN INTRODUCTION TO SELF-REFLEXIVE (VIDEO)GAMES: 
Self-reflexive videogames are videogames that are deliberately designed to materialize, through their 
gameplay and their aesthetic qualities, critical and/or satirical perspectives on the ways in which video-
games themselves are designed, played, sold, manipulated, experienced, and understood as social ob-
jects. The subversion of representational and/or interactive canons, and the often jeering meta-
representation of (video)ludic objects are design strategies that are frequently employed in the realiza-
tion of such videogames. 
Self-reflexive video games typically question their own (generic) technical, interactive, and thematic 
conventions by intentionally provoking a sense of unease and unfamiliarity in their players and specta-
tors. From this perspective, they can be recognized as aspiring to produce experiential effects that are 
conceptually comparable to those pursued by some of the currents of the philosophical and artistic 
movement customarily labeled ‘modernism’. The bizarre and unfamiliar aesthetics embraced by several 
modernist currents explicitly attempted to unsettle the observer, the reader, the spectator, the player, 
and to elicit in them a state of detached, suspicious inquiry. This state of mind was recognized and 
sought-after by the Dadaists, the surrealists, and the situationists among others as the necessary pre-
condition for demystifying representational as well as cultural conventions, and ultimately for reforming 
society (Laxton, 2003; Flanagan, 2009, 88-94; Gualeni, 2015a, 63–67; Van Roessel, 2008, 44, 45). A few, 
particularly noteworthy examples are in this sense Bertolt Brecht’s ‘epic theatre’, Alexander M. Rod-
chenko’s works of photomontage and photography, Lev Tolstoy’s literary production, and the practice of 
Surrealist play. 
In a similar way, the aesthetic and interactive experiences of self-reflexive videogames are designed 
with the overt intention of establishing – through astonishment and unfamiliarity – a degree of analyti-
cal distance between players and videogames, turning the latter (embraced together with their estab-
lished conventions and tropes) into objects of critical analysis. As Brecht phrased it, the spectators (or, in 
this case, the players of self-reflexive videogames) “need to develop that detached eye with which the 
great Galileo observed a swinging chandelier.” (Brecht, 1964, 192) 
With those objectives in mind, these kinds of unsettling videogames typically disclose experiences that 
are not inherently enjoyable or rewarding. In analogy with Brecht’s ‘epic theatre’, their gameplay tends 
to be uncouth and drily instrumental to their experiential and critical goals. Self-reflexive videogames do 
not generally employ interactive and aesthetic techniques that try to make their players identify with 
the playing characters, unless with the intention of pulling that empathetic rug from under the players’ 
feet later in the gameplay. In this sense, they are not typically designed to elicit a sense of catharsis in 
the Aristotelian sense – that is to say to trigger “the purging of the emotions through empathy with the 
stirring fate of the hero” (Benjamin, 1999, 147). 
Subverting conventions and making grotesque mockeries out of traditional tropes, self-reflexive video-
games prompt us to become aware of the ways in which we currently play, design, develop, sell, modify, 
criticize, and attribute social values to videogames and videogame elements. This seditious approach to 
game design is pursued by self-reflexive videogames to the extent that, if we were to try to identify their 
‘gameness’ in terms of formal properties, many would barely be recognizable as games at all. It is not 
infrequent for them to be roughly executed, short-lived, unwinnable, and deliberately annoying1.  
In the pursuit of subversion and ‘defamiliarization’, the gameplay of self-reflexive titles often includes 
the overt exhibition of the ‘constructedness’ of videogames as artifacts (for example displaying debug 
                                                          
1 The intentionally frustrating and raw aesthetic qualities of gameplay in self-reflexive videogames can be exemplified by 
Failnaut’s videogame Grindstar (2012). Grindstar can be freely accessed online at 
http://www.newgrounds.com/portal/view/605910.    
information or background geometry, deliberately triggering aesthetic glitches, and making elements of 
how a game engine triggers scripted actions visible). Instead of excluding the artificiality and the tech-
nical setup of videogames from their gameplay (removing them, or keeping them only accessible to the 
game developers), those aspects are frequently and purposefully exposed. Particularly evident examples 
of this design strategy for unsettling the players are encountered in the recent videogames releases The 
Beginner’s Guide (Everything Unlimited Ltd., 2015) and The Magic Circle (Question, 2015) , in which de-
sign decisions and technical solutions are aesthetically revealed during gameplay and are openly dis-
cussed by in-game characters (including the narrator) as a key feature of their gameplay. In the sense 
explained above, The Beginner’s Guide, The Magic Circle, and NECESSARY EVIL (discussed and analyzed 
in the upcoming sections of this essay) be considered examples of games with evident self-reflexive 
traits and objectives. 
 
1.2 – NECESSARY EVIL: A SELF-REFLEXIVE VIDEOGAME 
 
NECESSARY EVIL (http://evil.gua-le-ni.com) is a small, single-player, experimental videogame that was 
developed by Dino Dini, Marcello Gómez Maureira, Jimena Sánchez Sarquiz, Allister Brimble and myself 
during the summer of 2013. NECESSARY EVIL was designed with the intention of revealing to its players 
– through its aesthetics and gameplay – that the ways in which we conceptualize, design, and develop 
videogames all rely on an implicit player-centric ideology. According to this ideological framework, the 
virtual worlds of videogames and digital simulations are typically produced and presented in ways that 
allow for a specific way of ‘revealing’: a way of disclosing an experience that is exclusively limited to the 
perspective of the player(s).  
In current practical terms, when we approach virtual worlds as (experiential and technical) products of 
this ideology, the experience horizon that they afford can be understood as being explicitly generated 
around the players’ perceptual and interactive possibilities. As a case in point, elements of an interac-
tive, digital world that are too far from the players to be perceived, virtual objects whose sight is occlud-
ed by other virtual objects  and characters that are momentarily irrelevant for gameplay or for a certain 
world-simulation are not actually materialized by the software, and only exist as potentiality2. 
                                                          
2 Interestingly, from an etymological perspective, the adjective ‘virtual’ was originally coined in modern Latin to encapsulate the 
idea of ‘potentiality’.  Virtualis is a late-medieval neologism the existence of which became necessary when Aristotle’s concept 
Technically speaking, every virtual world tacitly materializes what could be identified as an idealistic per-
spective. According to a radical version of idealism – for example in the case of George Berkeley’s sub-
jective idealism – the qualities that we can experientially encounter in objects (regardless of whether 
they are part of the actual world or of a virtual one) are not objective properties of those objects. From 
an idealistic standpoint, it is our experience of those objects that is responsible for bringing them and 
their properties into existence as mental contents (Gualeni, 2015a, 88). 
This idealistic foundations of the ways in which we technically materialize virtual worlds has, first and 
foremost, the functional scope of limiting the amount of calculations that are needed to sustain that 
virtual world. It is a convenient – if not necessary – evil. 
 
1.3 – A SELF-REFLEXIVE DESIGN ANALYSIS OF NECESSARY EVIL 
NECESSARY EVIL was designed and developed with the intention of playfully problematizing the unques-
tioned idealistic structuring of virtual worlds that was outlined in the previous section of this essay. In 
doing so, it also inevitably ridicules the player-centrism of videogame worlds, thus functioning as a self-
reflexive videogame. 
From a game design perspective, and similarly to most games that are understood as having self-
reflexive qualities, NECESSARY EVIL heavily relies on interaction norms, narrative tropes, and aesthetic 
conventions that are firmly established in the tradition of a particular game genre (in this specific case, 
the fantasy action role-play-videogame genre). The repetition of time-honored traditions in videogame 
aesthetic, videogame narrative, and videogame interaction appears to be consistently preferred to the 
pursuit of formal and/or technical innovation when developing self-reflexive videogames. This design 
strategy must be recognized the dual advantage of 
1) not requiring the players to learn (or to learn from scratch) how to operate within the virtual 
world which the self-reflexive videogame discloses for its players. This advantage includes not 
having to familiarize with the ways in which abstract and extra-diegetic information are encoded 
and represented. In this way, the designers can focus on the alteration and repurposing of spe-
cific areas or elements of the game that they intend to subvert and trigger critical thought upon, 
and  
2) making the destabilized (and destabilizing) aspects of the game emerge with particular evi-
dence by way of contrast; that is to say by making in-game elements and behaviors stand out as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of δύναμις (dynamis: potentiality, power, quadrate) had to be translated into Latin (Van Binsbergen, 1997, 9). The concept of 
‘potentiality’ at the etymological foundation of the adjective ‘virtual’ provides the background for understanding why, at least 
in one of its interpretations, it is used to indicate the latency of certain possibilities inherent in a specific artifact, combination 
of artifacts, or state of things. In this understanding, the adjective ‘virtual’ works in counterpoint with the adjective ‘actual’, 
where the latter does not indicate a potential state of affairs, but the current, presently existing one. A more common connota-
tion of the adjective ‘virtual’ was presented by Pierre Lévy not in opposition to ‘actual’ in the sense discussed above, but to 
‘actual’ in the specific meaning of “pertinent to the world humans are native to.” (Lévy, 1998, 14) 
unexpected and uncanny against the backdrop of the bulk of notions and conventions that the 
players are considered to be already largely accustomed to. 
In order to function as a critical artifact, as already explained, the game relies on its players’ familiarity 
with the ludo-narrative structures that the game mockingly discloses3. Consequently, a large portion of 
the gameplay of NECESSARY EVIL aligns to traditional canons and functions accordingly. On the back-
drop of that conventional background, and in order to demystify the player-centric approach outlined 
above, the game crucially subverts a specific interaction trope: it gives the player control over a contrib-
utory character. In NECESSARY EVIL, the player takes the role of a disposable minion of evil instead of 
the customary part of the valiant hero, a paragon of valor. In line with the aesthetic canons of action 
role-playing videogames, the players are supposed to recognize the minion of evil that they control as a 
generic, minor figure: a secondary character that plays a subaltern role in the progress of the main char-
acter – the hero. In NECESSARY EVIL, the hero is a computer-controlled non-player character (NPC) (see 
figure 2). 
 
 
                                                          
3 Similarly, in Brechtian ‘epic theatre’ the intended spectators should already be familiar with what is being represented. This 
trait contributed to shifting the focus of the experience away from its narrative contents of a certain work, and to prevent the 
public from being emotionally involved in the events taking place on the stage (or in the virtual world in question). In these 
contexts and with those ‘estranging’ objectives, according to Van Roessel, “telling an old story is a benefit rather than a draw-
back.” (Van Roessel, 2008, 44) 
Figure 1: In NECESSARY EVIL, the player’s interactions with the environment are func-
tionally pointless; the little horned minion of evil controlled by the player cannot trigger 
any useful interactions with the room or escape from it. 
In our self-reflexive videogame, the horned minion controlled by the players is confined in a dimly-lit 
room from which it cannot escape (see figure 1). The monster has, in fact, no constructive options for 
interacting with the room: the door does not open for its little red paws, the chest contains nothing, and 
the objects that are already in the room respond to the players’ actions as if they were cheap theatrical 
props. These design decisions were meant to elicit a sense of marginality in the players, and to experien-
tially reveal to them what a virtual world feels like when that world is designed around someone else’s 
perceptions, needs, and narrative progress.  In other words, the players’ possibility for interaction with 
the world of NECESSARY EVIL, as well as the duration and the quality of their experience, are deliberate-
ly designed to be deficient and unsatisfactory (Gualeni, 2015b). 
 
 
Figure 2: In NECESSARY EVIL, the hero is an outspoken and relentless non-player charac-
ter whose objective is to vanquish evil; he will attack the monstrous player-character in-
stantly and without apparent reasons. 
As a consequence of what was just discussed, the virtual world of NECESSARY EVIL is likely to be under-
stood by the players as existing only to be experienced by the NPC-hero, and not to be enjoyed or ex-
plored by the horned monster. The little monster merely poses a challenge among many others: it is 
something for the hero to overcome in order to continue on his intrepid quest. Eventually, the comput-
er-controlled hero accidentally enters the room where the monster is trapped. As expected in these 
videoludic situations, a fight ensues between good and evil. After the fight, when the horned monster is 
finally slain, the computer-controlled hero collects a key from the chest, opens the door, and leaves the 
room4. At that point, the room itself, its elements, and the player-creature are swiftly removed from the 
computer’s memory, which consists – from the point of view of the monster – in witnessing the ‘de-
rezzing’ and disappearance of the game-world. This concluding act is symmetrical to the loading process 
that the players experienced at the beginning of the game. Both the beginning and the end of 
NECESSARY EVIL try to metaphorically communicate the players the ‘constructedness’ of the game as a 
technical artifact: the de-allocation of elements and characters is needed to save memory and computa-
tion resources in order to efficiently materialize the rooms that are (implicitly) going to be visited next 
by the hero. 
 
(END OF PART 1) 
 
2.1 – ON VIDEOGAMES AS CRITICAL TOOLS 
Through the ‘defamiliarization’ of aesthetic and interactive conventions – and thus by encouraging play-
ers to see the videogames ‘anew’ and recognize them as possible objects of analysis and/or satire5 – 
self-reflexive videogames perform specific critical functions in our culture. As cultural artifacts and as 
mediators of thought, they disclose perspectives and notions that are often tacitly and unwittingly ex-
cluded from practices and theories concerning virtual worlds and videogames. Similarly, as discussed 
and exemplified in the first part of this essay, the social agenda of several modernist currents relied pre-
cisely on the conviction that the self-reflexivity of expressive media forms (or, more generally artistic 
techniques and design strategies meant to make mediated content feel astonishing and unfamiliar) 
could foster a ‘state of suspicious inquiry’ imbued with critical potential. The modernists deemed this 
‘state’ to be to be capable of insinuating alternative possibilities of being and promoting change at the 
broader socio-cultural level. 
                                                          
4 If the players are particularly proficient with their control of the little monster, it is also possible for them to defeat the NPC-
hero. Once the hero is defeated, however, the game promptly triggers a ‘game over’ state. This behavior might be unexpected 
(and hopefully even unpleasant) for the players, as their gameplay experience is interrupted by the ‘game over’ screen (a cus-
tomary way of giving negative feedback to the players) after having successfully accomplished a difficult task. This design deci-
sion is, however, logical. It aligns with the intention of experientially revealing to the player that it is the experiential path of the 
hero and his situation that are relevant to the game state, while the skill level and the aspirations of a subsidiary character are . 
5 Poignant theoretical and critical references that I consider worth mentioning in support of this argument are Viktor Shklov-
sky’s notion of ostranenie (‘estrangement’, ‘defamiliarization’) and Ezra Pound’s dictum “make it new”. In several essays of the 
American poet, “make it new” encapsulated what he understood the defining feature of modernist aesthetic: a change of per-
spective that allows the recipients of the work of art to rediscover their familiar world and to reshape their sensitivity and per-
spectives (Shklowsky, 1917; Pound, 1934). 
The question I am tackling in this section of my essay, however, is not whether the self-reflexivity of me-
diated content can effectively be understood as a factor of socio-cultural change. In the specific context 
of game studies, in fact, the notion that virtual worlds could be embraced as interactive arguments, as 
academic output, and as critical artifacts has been firmly established since at least a decade ago (de-
pending on the ‘origin myth’ one decides to embrace in that respect) (Bogost, 2007; Bogost, 2011; 
Grace, 2014). Contemporary culture already recognizes virtual worlds of videogames and digital simula-
tions as viable and often desirable alternatives to traditional media forms. This is particularly evident in 
contexts such as education, persuasion, and training. The question I am asking in this second part of my 
essay is whether those worlds, both in their self-reflexive qualities and inherently as ‘worlds’, can be 
understood as philosophical artifacts. 
I believe this question can be fruitfully asked – and perhaps even answered – from the standpoint ac-
cording to which the central modus operandi of philosophy consists in guiding thought to rigorously re-
flect on the correctness and the possibilities of thought itself. In pursuing this task, the philosophers of 
language dedicate their academic efforts assessing the validity and correctness of linguistic propositions. 
Their perspectives rely on the idea that language holds a privileged – if not throughout exclusive – rela-
tionship with thinking. In academic fields like philosophy of language and psychology, the two are often 
conflated (Petocz, 1999, 186-188). To be sure, approaches and models that are founded in some form of 
identification between thought and language are not only common to philosophy of language or psy-
chology: in contemporary philosophy of mind, for example, the understanding of mental states (such as 
beliefs, desires, etc.) as ‘propositional attitudes’ is often accompanied by the belief that such states are 
thereby linguistic (ibid., 186). 
Since Plato, for reasons that are rooted in socio-technological context of fifth-century Greece, the histo-
ry of philosophy has been specifically identified with the history of a particular declination of a linguistic 
approach to philosophy: written philosophy. Interestingly, these reasons also started to be explicitly 
discussed in some of Plato’s own texts, for example in the The Seventh Letter or in the Socratic dialogue 
Phaedrus. One of the first twentieth century philosophers to advocate for a critical attitude towards the 
exclusive and often unquestioned association between thinking and writing was Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
However, apart from a few remarkable exceptions (among which Wittgenstein’s own 1929 Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus and Jacques Derrida’s 1974 Glas), philosophical texts have rarely supported and 
complemented their perspectives and arguments by means of their physical design and/or editorial 
structure. Hardly ever has philosophy materially expressed reflections on its very materiality6. 
The enduring and exclusive focus on linguistic ways (and, in particular, on written ways) of mediating 
thought can be understood from this perspective as having numbed the sensitivity of Western philoso-
phy towards the specificities and the limitations through which that specific form of mediation frames 
and sequences arguments and ideas. I believe that it can also be accused of having made philosophers 
                                                          
6 A similar argument was raised by German philosopher Friedrich Kittler in his 2011 article ‘Towards an Ontology of Media’. In 
his text, Kittler addresses the systematic exclusion of physical and technical mediation from the practice and the objectives of 
philosophical thinking, arguing that it was only thanks to the work of Martin Heidegger that a philosophical consciousness for 
technical mediation finally arose (Kittler, 2011). 
poorly capable of entertaining the possibility of alternative methods for mediating philosophical 
thought. This almost complete eclipse of philosophy’s critical attitude towards the medium-exclusivity 
and the viability of alternative ways of mediating thought (and thinking) is what the second part of this 
essay tries to challenge in the age of digital media. 
Motivated by similar concerns as mine, philosopher and game designer Ian Bogost recently went as far 
as accusing the focus on the practice of writing of being a detrimental habit for the humanities in gen-
eral. In his 2012 book, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing, he noted that “[t]he long-
standing assumption that we relate to the world only through language is a particularly fetid, if still baf-
flingly popular, opinion.” (Bogost, 2012, 90) Bogost and, before him, philosopher Davis Baird proposed 
a remedy for this alleged cultural malaise that consisted in the embracing of ‘building’ (understood as 
the academic praxis of ‘doing’, of ‘constructing things’ as a heuristic practice) as a possible, fruitful al-
ternative to the logo-centrism of the humanities. The practice of constructing artifacts as a philosophi-
cal practice offers, according to the outlined perspectives, an opportunity  
“to correct the discursive and linguistic bias of the humanities. According 
to this view, we should be open to communicating scholarship through 
artifacts, whether digital or not. It implies that print is, indeed, ill 
equipped [sic] to deal with entire classes of knowledge that are presum-
ably germane to humanistic inquiry.” (Ramsay and Rockwell in Gold, 
2012, 78) 
Having recognized the inherent limitations and effects of linguistic ways of framing and communicating 
thought, it would be illogical to propose to embrace ‘building’ as the ultimate philosophical medium. 
The use of virtual media7 or other forms of practical involvement as ways to pursue philosophical 
thought through ‘doing’ can intuitively be understood as overcoming some of the inadequacies and 
limitations that are inherent to an exclusively linguistic – or more specifically textual – mediation of 
thought. It is, however, a form of ‘overcoming’ that inevitably brings about new philosophical prob-
lems, limitations, and discontents. The embedding of videogames and computer simulations in social 
practices (philosophy being one of them) might, thus, best be pursued on the basis of the understand-
ing that, as with any other forms of mediation, their virtual worlds disclose reality in specific ways, and 
that such ways are always inherently both revealing and concealing (Gualeni, 2015a, 94). New ways of 
establishing relationships with reality through media necessarily entail a balance between the increase 
in acuity of certain cognitive functions and the desensitization of others (McLuhan, 1994). 
In this essay, and in the larger context of my philosophical work, I do not argue that the design and ex-
perience of virtual worlds should be understood as exceptional – or even as particularly desirable forms 
                                                          
7 With ‘virtual media’ I indicate ways of mediating notions and perspectives that do not rely on semiotic encoding and represen-
tation, but rather on the interactive experiential engagement with a certain virtual artifact. In this sense, both the design of- 
and the interaction with- a certain virtual artifact, or group of virtual artifacts, or system of virtual artifacts could be considered 
to be potentially viable academic practices. It is important to observe, for the sake of completeness, that – despite their differ-
ence and specificities – both media forms (representational and virtual) allow the possibility to engage the mediated contents 
hermeneutically at several levels. 
of ‘doing’ philosophy. What I am proposing is, instead, that more scholarly efforts are devoted to de-
veloping both critical attitudes and sustained curiosity towards the possibilities and limitations offered 
by our larger technological environment to philosophy. To put it more practically, I am advocating for a 
more flexible and inclusive approach to the mediation of philosophical thought. From this standpoint, 
various and heterogeneous technical and expressive forms could be employed and combined to 
achieve the desired representational, persuasive, experiential, communicative, reflexive, and critical 
effects. Their synergic use could, I argue, potentially limit the emergence of biases relative to specific 
media forms and could complement and counterbalance the specific disadvantages inherent to each 
form. 
Going back to the specific point I am trying to make, I believe it is important to observe that interactive 
virtual worlds might not be particularly suitable for presenting abstract philosophical concepts in their 
full intricacy and subtlety. Similarly, traditional written discourse can be recognized as limited and par-
tial in its unsuitability to grant the recipient of a philosophical notion or argument direct experiential 
engagement with the notions and points of view that it mediates or the possibility to negotiate its 
premises and outcomes. These last possibilities are typically offered, instead, by virtual media. In this 
sense, there are several philosophical practices and arguments that could benefit by the hybridization 
with media forms that, for example, rely on simulation instead or representation as the dominant mode 
of the organization of cultural objects.  
We could, for instance, utilize virtual worlds in combination with textual explanations in philosophical 
contexts when detailed representations of spatial contexts are particularly salient to the point being 
made, or when the materialization of a specific situation is called for (for example in the case of 
thought experiments or the simulation of speculative ethical scenarios). Virtual media could be phe-
nomenologically and rhetorically advantageous when the recipients of a certain philosophical notion or 
perspective are expected to objectively test and evaluate different possible courses of action, or are 
confronted with interrogatives concerning non-actual or non-human phenomenologies, etc. For a more 
detailed and thorough discussion on the philosophical relevance of embracing the design and the expe-
riences of virtual worlds, please refer to chapters 4, 5, and 6 of my 2015 book Virtual Worlds and Philo-
sophical Tools.  
In NECESSARY EVIL, as a case in point, the philosophical arguments of the game are not only offered to 
the player in the form of an interactive experience, but is also summarized textually in the pages of a 
(simulated) book that can be encountered in the game world (see figure 3). 
 
 Figure 3: The argument brought forward by NECESSARY EVIL can be interactively experi-
enced in the virtual world that the game discloses, but can also be accessed in textual 
form. One of the books in the grubby library that furnishes the room contains a written 
summary of its key philosophical proposition. 
 
Not unlike videogames and virtual experiences that are designed with social purposes such as education 
and training, our self-reflexive videogame pursues its socio-cultural objectives via a number of commu-
nication modalities: linguistically (via text and speech), aesthetically (through visual, aural, and tactile 
rhetorical means of persuasion), and interactively (asking the players to evaluate their agency and their 
options in certain contexts, reinforcing and rewarding specific courses of action over others, et cetera) 
 
2.2 – CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Following a reflection on self-reflexivity in videogames, this essay advocated for a less intransigent ap-
proach to the articulation, the manipulation and the diffusion of philosophical ideas, notions, and hy-
potheses. In the preceding pages I proposed a more compromissory approach to thinking, an approach 
that is open to embrace – where contextually desirable – the hybridization (or even the substitution) of 
traditional media forms with activities that involve doing and/or experiencing something (within as well 
as without digital mediation).  
In developing my arguments, I did not only present a linguistic speculation on philosophical mediation, 
but combined philosophical text with philosophical gameplay within a virtual world. 
I would like to conclude with the observation that the framing, communicating, and problematizing of 
philosophical thought through virtual worlds will constitute, for twenty-first century philosophers, a 
challenge that goes beyond problematizing the exclusive use of written discourse. Philosophizing with 
(and through) virtual worlds will not simply consist in reframing and reformulating classical philosophical 
questions and perspectives, but already led to the inevitable emerging of new ways of thinking as well as 
new philosophical interrogatives. Such questions are often only possible to be articulated as – and/or 
within – virtual worlds and often reflect on their very digital mediation. I am referring, for example, to 
philosophical approaches to personal identities in cyberspace, to embodiment and mental dissociation 
in virtual worlds, to the ontological status of the virtual, to self-reflexivity in simulated worlds, to the our 
moral horizon in relation with artificial intelligences and virtual beings, to the relationships between 
actual-world policies and the ones that are enforced in virtual worlds, et cetera.  
It is in from this standpoint that I argue that virtual worlds need to be understood, studied, and used as 
the contexts in which a new humanism has already begun to arise. Wanna play? 
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